Volume 63, №. 1, March 2008
Managing Migration: The Global Challenge
by Philip Martin and Gottfried Zurcher
The number of international migrants is at an all-time
high. There were 191 million migrants in 2005, which means that
3 percent of the world's people left their country of birth or citizenship
for a year or more. The number of international migrants in industrialized
countries more than doubled between 1985 and 2005, from almost 55
million to 120 million.
However, most of the world's 6.6 billion people never
cross a national border; most live and die near their place of birth.
Those who cross national borders usually move to nearby countries,
for example, from Mexico to the United States, or from Turkey to
Germany. The largest flow of migrants is from less developed to
more developed countries (see figures). In 2005, 62 million migrants
from developing countries moved to more developed countries, but
almost as many migrants (61 million) moved from one developing country
to another, such as from Indonesia to Malaysia. Large flows of people
also move from one industrialized country to another, from Canada
to the United States, for example, and much smaller flows move from
more developed to less developed countries, such as people from
Japan who work in or retire to Thailand.
http://www.prb.org/pdf08/63.1migration.pdf
Volume 63, №. 2, June 2008
U.S. Labor Force Trends
by Marlene A. Lee and Mark Mather
During the past four decades, baby boomers coming of
age and the rise in women's labor force participation increased
the size of the U.S. labor force which, in turn, helped fuel economic
growth. The aging of baby boomers and the fact that women's labor
force participation has already peaked are expected to slow labor
force growth in the near future. Many policymakers and business
leaders are concerned that as baby boomers retire, labor productivity
will drop as more experienced workers are replaced by people with
fewer years on the job. But there are also potential benefits for
those seeking employment. For example, with a smaller pool of potential
workers, employers may provide extra incentives to retain employees
or to encourage women, the elderly, or people with disabilities
to enter the labor force. Another long-term employment trend since
the 1970s has been a shift in employment and population growth away
from the Midwest and Northeast toward the South and the West. Regional
differences in wages and cost of living; the attraction of natural
amenities; and a desire to escape congestion, pollution, and crime
in urban areas spurred these changes in the 1980s and 1990s. Another
related trend has been the growth of population and jobs in suburbs
and a decline in central cities. Demographic trends, with younger
populations in the West and South, suggest that these regional trends
will continue.
This Population Bulletin examines demographic and socioeconomic
characteristics of the U.S. civilian labor force and changes since
1950, and relates these trends to demographic and institutional
changes and economic restructuring internationally and within the
United States.
Some economists argue that technology changes, such
as computerization, have tended to complement the work of higher-educated
workers while replacing work for midlevel workers and hardly affecting
the more manual work of the lowest-paid tier. They propose this
as one reason for divergence in wages of the middle class and the
highest earners. With the availability of inexpensive computers,
demand has risen for the cognitive and interpersonal skills associated
with educated professionals and managers. At the same time, demand
for routine clerical and analytical skills used in many positions
filled by middle-educated white-collar workers has declined. Technology
has also reduced demand for routine manual skills used in high-paid
manufacturing production jobs, but nonroutine manual skills used
in many service jobs such as health aides, security guards, orderlies,
cleaners, and food servers have not been affected by computerization.
Recent trends in computerization of customer services and billing,
as well as new technology that facilitates offshore outsourcing
of these services, suggest that technology will continue to eliminate
some U.S. jobs.
In a global economy, a country such as the United States
is affected not only by its own demographic trends, but also by
the trends and policies in other countries. Many U.S. and foreign-owned
multinationals are shifting production from high-wage to low-wage
countries, with China as one of the primary destinations for jobs.
According to one study, companies shifting jobs tend to be large,well-established,
publicly held corporations. Manufacturing firms are the main source
of exported jobs, but offshore outsourcing of information technology
jobs and customer service jobs continues to grow.
Unionized workplaces are disproportionately affected
by U.S. production shifts offshore. A study by Bronfenbrenner and
Luce in 2004 estimated that 53 percent of jobs shifting out of the
United States to Mexico and 34 percent shifting to China were unionized.
The loss of union jobs through offshoring means that jobs leaving
the United States are more likely to be jobs with full health care
and pension plans. In addition to being costly to workers, losing
these types of jobs will be costly to some communities as this may
result in a declining tax base and greater demands on social services.
Global corporate restructuring and other trends in the
U.S. labor market also have the potential to exacerbate wage inequality.
Corporate restructuring creates pressure to contain total compensation
for many low-wage and mid-level workers but increases returns to
managers at the highest levels where compensation may be linked
to profits. In addition, the demand for higher-educated workers
combined with technology will continue to widen the wage gap between
the highly educated and the less skilled.
http://www.prb.org/pdf08/63.2uslabor.pdf
Volume 63, №. 3, September 2008
World Population Highlights. Key Findings From PRB's 2008 World
Population Data Sheet
by Population Reference Bureau staff
http://www.prb.org/pdf08/63.3highlights.pdf
Volume 63, №. 4, December 2008
Rethinking Age and Aging
by Warren Sanderson and Sergei Scherbov
According to the United Nations (UN), "Population
ageing is unprecedented, without parallel in human history and the
twenty-first century will witness even more rapid ageing than did
the century just past." In contrast to the growth of interest
in and concern about population aging, the concepts used in analyzing
it have remained static.
With advances in health and life expectancy, measuring
population aging presents a problem to demographers because the
meaning of the number of years lived has changed. In western Europe
in 1800, for example, less than 25 percent of males would survive
to age 60, while today more than 90 percent of them do. A 60-year-old
man in western Europe today has around the same remaining life expectancy
as a 43-year-old man in 1800. Today, a person who is 60 is considered
middle-aged; in 1800, that 60-year-old was elderly. Older people
are regularly doing things that were the province of younger people
only a few years earlier. Now, 80-year-olds get knee replacements
so they can continue hiking. Older people tend to have fewer disabilities
than people of the same age in earlier decades, and now there is
some evidence that cognitive decline is being postponed as well.
The media have recognized this change. We often read
that "40 is the new 30," but this is more than just a
pop culture phrase. It is a challenge to demographers to rethink
how they measure a population's age and the pace of aging. This
Population Bulletin illustrates how to use new measures of population
aging that take into account changes in longevity over time and
place. None of the usual indicators of aging available adjust for
increases in life expectancy. With advances in health and life expectancy,
measuring population aging presents a problem to demographers because
the meaning of the number of years lived has changed. New measures
described in this Population Bulletin take life expectancy differences
into account. First, we discuss the surprising history of life expectancy
change within the last 150 years. Because of increases in life expectancies,
it is misleading to compare those who are chronologically age 40
today with people who were 40 a century ago. Second, we introduce
the concept of "prospective age" as a way to compare people
who live in periods and places where life expectancies differ. Finally,
we build on the concept of prospective age in developing alternative
definitions of median age, the elderly population, and old-age dependency
ratios.
http://www.prb.org/pdf08/63.4aging.pdf
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